

SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974

Case No. 12901-2026

BETWEEN:

RAJ RAJAN MARIADDAN

Applicant

and

SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY LTD

Respondent

Before:

Mr J Abramson (in the chair)

Mr A Horrocks

Dr P Iyer

Dates of Hearing: 14 August 2026 and 25 August 2026

Appearances

Ian Skeate, barrister, The Barrister Group, 81 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1DD (instructed by the Applicant).

Charlotte Elves, barrister, Outer Temple Chambers, Strand, London WC2R 1BA (instructed by the Respondent).

JUDGMENT

APPLLCATION FOR RESTORATION TO THE ROLL

Introduction and Procedural Context

1. The Applicant applied for restoration to the Roll of Solicitors. He was admitted to the Roll on 15 November 1995.
2. The Applicant was, until April 2019, a sole practitioner, practising under the name of John Street Solicitors. In April 2019 he entered into a partnership with Mr Saltifi and commenced practice through John Street Solicitors LLP based in London, NW10.
3. The Applicant and Mr Saltifi were equal partners in the Firm which was a Limited Liability Partnership and a recognised body.
4. The Applicant appeared before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) between 18 and 21 October 2021 and again on 25 January 2022. The allegations against him included causing or allowing misleading information to be provided to a law firm acting in connection with Legal Aid Agency proceedings and causing or allowing misleading information to be provided to an insurance broker in connection with the renewal of the Firm's professional indemnity insurance. It was further alleged that the Applicant continued to practise, including holding client money, without valid professional indemnity insurance.
5. The allegations relating to the provision of misleading information to the law firm and to the insurance broker were advanced on the basis that the Applicant’s conduct was dishonest. The Tribunal found all allegations proved, including dishonesty, and in a judgment dated 21 February 2022, ordered that the Applicant be struck off the Roll of Solicitors and pay costs in the sum of £30,947.64. The present application is not an appeal against those findings and sanction, which remain final.
6. On 17 April 2025, the Applicant filed an Application for restoration to the Roll, Case No. 12755-2025. That application was refused following a hearing on 15 August 2025.
7. This is a fresh application by the Applicant for restoration, opposed by the Respondent, to be determined on the evidence, submissions, and material before this Tribunal. The previous restoration decision does not determine the present application but forms part of the relevant procedural background.

Documents Considered by the Tribunal

8. The Tribunal considered all the documents contained in the electronic case file. In particular, it considered:
 - (a) The Applicant’s Application dated 29 January 2026, supporting statement and exhibits bundle.
 - (b) The Respondent’s Answer to the Application for Restoration dated 18 March 2026.
 - (c) The Applicant’s Reply to the Answer dated 30 March 2026.

- (d) The Respondent's Response dated 9 July 2026 to the Applicant's Witness Statements dated 1 and 20 June 2026.
- (e) The Applicant's Fourth Witness Statement dated 6 August 2026.
- (f) The Respondent's Skeleton Argument dated 11 August 2026.
- (g) The Respondent's Statement of Costs dated 9 July 2026.

The Applicant's Submissions

- 9. The Applicant submitted that he accepted the findings made in the substantive disciplinary proceedings, including the findings of dishonesty, and was not seeking to challenge either the findings or the sanction imposed by the Tribunal in February 2022.
- 10. The Applicant submitted that he had demonstrated insight, remorse, and rehabilitation since strike-off. Reliance was placed upon reflective work, training, assistance said to have been provided to others following his removal from the Roll, and evidence from those who knew him personally.
- 11. The Applicant relied significantly upon medical evidence. He submitted that the Tribunal should take account of his history of cardiac arrest, stroke, and cognitive difficulties. Whilst not seeking to challenge the original findings, he submitted that the medical evidence provided important context to the circumstances in which the misconduct had occurred.
- 12. The Applicant further submitted that he presented a low future risk to the public. He stated that if restored, he would seek to practise only in a limited and supervised capacity, without managerial responsibilities, compliance responsibilities, or control of client money.
- 13. The Applicant accepted that the application had been made before the expiry of six years from the original strike-off order. He submitted, however, that exceptional circumstances existed which justified the Tribunal entertaining the application at this stage.
- 14. The Applicant accordingly invited the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to restore him to the Roll.

Oral Evidence of the Applicant

- 15. The Applicant gave evidence, a summary which is set out below:
 - (a) The Applicant confirmed that he understood the importance of candour in restoration proceedings and had sought to provide a full and accurate account in his witness statements. He explained that his references to an "unblemished" professional career derived from the fact that he had at one point been issued with a Certificate of Good Standing by the SRA, which he understood reflected an assessment of his practising history. He accepted, however, that his professional history included earlier disciplinary findings and practising certificate conditions. He stated that those matters were historic and that he had not intended to mislead the Tribunal.

- (b) The Applicant maintained that, although formally struck off in February 2022, his practical removal from legal practice occurred on 29 January 2021 when the SRA intervened into his practice. He explained that the intervention resulted in the removal of files, computers, records, and client matters, which effectively brought his career to an end. Whilst accepting that a conditional practising certificate was subsequently granted, he maintained that he was unable meaningfully to practise following the intervention.
- (c) In response to questions about a previous Court judgment (an extract from which had been exhibited by him) in which findings had been made that he had lied and given false evidence, the Applicant accepted that those findings had been made. He stated, however, that the proceedings occurred during a period of significant ill-health when he was suffering from the effects of a heart attack, stroke, and extensive medication. He maintained that those findings should be considered in the context of his health at that time.
- (d) Whilst not seeking to challenge the findings made by the Tribunal that led to him being struck off, he maintained that the medical evidence regarding his cardiac arrest, stroke, memory difficulties, and cognitive problems provided important context to the circumstances in which the misconduct occurred. He stated that the records demonstrated an ongoing pattern of cognitive and health difficulties and not merely isolated episodes of illness.
- (e) In response to questions about medical records referring to cognitive difficulties which “*may have been caused*” by a hypoxic event, he accepted that the records did not contain a formal diagnosis of hypoxic brain injury but stated that they nevertheless evidenced cognitive impairment. He further explained that certain medical records relied upon by him had existed previously but had not, in his view, been properly before earlier tribunals, and that he had taken care to place them before the Tribunal in the present proceedings.
- (f) In relation to rehabilitation, the Applicant stated that he had undertaken training, maintained an interest in legal developments, and reflected upon the events that led to his strike-off. He accepted that he had limited documentary evidence demonstrating completion of some training courses but maintained that he had attended and completed them. He further stated that, since his removal from the Roll, he had provided assistance to others on a non-reserved and often pro bono basis, whilst making clear that he was no longer entitled to practise as a solicitor.
- (g) The Applicant stated that, if restored to the Roll, he did not seek a return to unrestricted practice. Rather, he envisaged practising in an employed and supervised capacity without managerial responsibilities, compliance responsibilities, or control of client money.
- (h) The Applicant relied on a previous Memorandum of Understanding involving a collaboration with Peterson International Law Associates LLP as demonstrating a long-standing intention to move away from sole practice. Whilst accepting that there was no current offer of employment to him from that firm, he stated that he considered that meaningful discussions regarding employment could only occur once he was restored to the Roll.

- (i) In response to questions from the Tribunal, the Applicant confirmed that he had previously been made bankrupt, and the bankruptcy had subsequently been discharged. He also confirmed that he had not paid the costs ordered following the previous restoration application and he believed that they had been written off by the SRA. The Applicant explained that he was not working and had limited financial means. He was also questioned about his current cognitive functioning. He stated that any cognitive difficulties had improved significantly and that he considered himself capable of undertaking legal work if restored.
- (j) The Applicant was further questioned by the Tribunal about insight, risk, and his reasons for pursuing restoration. He stated that he accepted the findings made against him, including the findings of dishonesty, and described insight as involving remorse, regret, and recognition of his failings. He maintained that he did not present a risk to the public and stated that, if he believed that he did pose such a risk, he would prefer not to practise. He explained that his motivation for applying for restoration was to demonstrate that he had reflected upon the events which led to his strike-off and, if permitted, to return to legal work in a cautious and restricted capacity.

The Submissions of the Respondent

- 16. Dr Elves, on behalf of the Respondent, opposed the application. She submitted that the Applicant faced a high hurdle in seeking restoration to the Roll, particularly where the original strike-off followed findings of dishonesty. The Respondent submitted that the Tribunal's focus should be on whether exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated, whether there remained a risk to the public, and whether restoration would be consistent with maintaining public confidence in the solicitors' profession.
- 17. As to rehabilitation, Dr Elves submitted that the evidence relied upon by the Applicant was insufficient. She submitted that the evidence relating to training did not establish attendance or completion, and that the Applicant had not provided satisfactory documentary evidence of structured learning, reflection, or remediation. She also submitted that the Applicant's evidence of assistance provided to others after strike-off raised concerns rather than demonstrating rehabilitation, particularly in light of the limited evidence that those persons understood his practising status.
- 18. Dr Elves submitted that the Applicant's supporting evidence and his conduct of this application raised issues of candour and completeness. In particular, she relied upon the evidence of the Applicant's former wife and current carer and submitted that the nature of that relationship had not been made clear in the evidence presented to the Tribunal by the Respondent. She also relied upon correspondence sent after the Applicant had been struck off from an email address associated with the intervened firm and submitted that this created a risk of misunderstanding as to the Applicant's status.
- 19. In relation to future employment, Dr Elves submitted that the Applicant had not provided any current offer of employment, any detailed proposal for supervision, or sufficient information about the work he would undertake if restored. She submitted that reliance upon the 2018 Memorandum of Understanding involving Peterson International Law Associates LLP did not provide a proper evidential basis upon which the Tribunal could assess future risk or suitability for restoration.

20. In conclusion, the Respondent's position was that the Applicant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances, that the application remained premature, that rehabilitation and insight had not been sufficiently established, and that restoration would give rise to risk to the public and would undermine public confidence in the profession. The Respondent therefore invited the Tribunal to refuse the application.

Legal Framework

21. The Tribunal approached the application on the basis that it was exercising its restoration jurisdiction pursuant to section 47(2)(f) of the Solicitors Act 1974 and Rule 17 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019.
22. The burden rests upon the Applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that restoration to the Roll is appropriate. The Tribunal's task is not to revisit the findings made in the substantive disciplinary proceedings or to conduct a further appeal against the strike-off order.
23. The Tribunal had regard to its *Guidance Note on Other Powers*, 7th Edition (February 2025) and in particular the guidance on Restoration to the Roll (at page 6), which states that save in the most exceptional circumstances, an application made within six years of the original strike-off is likely to be regarded as premature.
24. The Tribunal also had regard to the authorities to which it was referred, including *Bolton v Law Society* [1994] 1 WLR 512, *Jideofor v Law Society (No. 6 of 2006)* [2007] EWLS 3, *Thobani v Solicitors Regulation Authority* [2011] EWHC 3783 (Admin) and *Solicitors Regulation Authority v Kaberry* [2012] EWHC 3883 (Admin). The Tribunal reminded itself that restoration following a strike-off for dishonesty is exceptional and the paramount considerations are the protection of the public and the maintenance of public confidence in the profession.
25. The Tribunal had particular regard to *Bolton v Law Society* [1994] 1 WLR 512 [at paragraph 16], and noted that whilst matters such as hardship, personal mitigation, rehabilitation, and the consequences of a refusal of restoration are relevant considerations, they do not displace the essential issue of maintaining public confidence in the integrity, probity, and trustworthiness of the profession.
26. The Tribunal also considered the public confidence formulation referred to in *Re a Solicitor No. 5 of 1987* and in *Thobani* namely whether a reasonably informed member of the public, knowing the relevant facts, would say, "*Really any profession should be proud to re-admit the Applicant as a member*" [at paragraph 28]. The Tribunal approached the present application on the basis that it required an assessment not only of future risk, but also of integrity, rehabilitation, insight, redemption of reputation and the wider reputation of the profession.
27. In determining the application, the Tribunal considered, amongst other matters:
 - (a) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct which led to strike-off.
 - (b) the period of time since strike off and the Tribunal's guidance concerning applications made within six years of the original strike off.

- (c) the extent of the Applicant's insight and acceptance of responsibility.
- (d) evidence of rehabilitation.
- (e) the Applicant's conduct since strike-off.
- (f) the existence or otherwise of exceptional circumstances.
- (g) the Applicant's future employment intentions.
- (h) the extent to which restoration would be compatible with the protection of the public and the maintenance of public confidence in the profession.

The Tribunal's Decision

28. The Tribunal recognised that there is no hard-and-fast rule that a solicitor who has been struck off for dishonesty can never be restored to the Roll. The Tribunal also recognised that strike-off is not, in law, a life sentence and that the Solicitors Act 1974 confers a discretion upon the Tribunal to restore a solicitor to the Roll in an appropriate case. However, the Tribunal also noted that, where dishonesty has been proved, the exercise of that discretion will ordinarily require the demonstration of exceptional circumstances, as reflected in long-standing authority, including *Re a Solicitor No. 5 of 1987* (unreported), and consistently emphasised in subsequent jurisprudence.
29. The Applicant was struck off the Roll on 21 February 2022. The hearing for the present application commenced on 15 August 2026, approximately four years and six months after the strike-off order. The Tribunal noted that this was the Applicant's second application for restoration made within the six-year period identified in the Guidance and that save in the most exceptional circumstances, an application made within a six year period was likely to be regarded as premature.
30. The Tribunal considered the Applicant's submission that, for all practical purposes, his legal career had ended on 29 January 2021 following the intervention into his practice and, for that reason, the present application should not be regarded as premature. The Tribunal noted that, notwithstanding the intervention, the Applicant had been granted a conditional practising certificate in June 2021.
31. Whilst the Tribunal accepted that the intervention had significant practical consequences for the Applicant's practice, the evidence did not establish it had the effect of a strike-off order for purposes of calculating the period specified in the Guidance. The Guidance expressly refers to the date of the original strike-off order as the relevant starting point and the Tribunal interpreted it accordingly. The Applicant was struck off on 21 February 2022, and the present application therefore fell to be assessed on the basis that it was made within six years of that order.
32. The Tribunal therefore went on to consider carefully whether the matters relied upon individually or cumulatively by the Applicant, including his medical evidence, his asserted rehabilitation, his efforts to update himself since the strike off and his future employment intentions, amounted to exceptional circumstances justifying restoration at this stage.

33. The Tribunal considered the medical evidence relied upon by the Applicant. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had experienced genuine and significant health difficulties and acknowledged that those conditions had undoubtedly affected him personally.
34. The Tribunal reminded itself that this was an application for restoration and not an appeal against the findings which led to the Applicant's strike-off. The Tribunal accepted that the medical evidence was relevant to the Applicant's present circumstances and to the assessment of future risk. The Tribunal therefore took the evidence into account as part of its overall assessment but did not regard it as materially assisting the Applicant's case for restoration.
35. The Tribunal then considered the evidence relied upon by the Applicant in support of his assertion that he had maintained his professional knowledge and competence since being struck off. The Applicant relied, amongst other matters, upon an ethics course which he stated he had undertaken and contended that he had continued to keep himself informed of developments in the law.
36. The only documentary evidence produced in respect of the ethics course was a record of payment to a course provider and a very small payment at that. Beyond the Applicant's assertion that he had completed the course and the evidence of payment; no independent documentary evidence of attendance or successful completion was produced. The Tribunal similarly did not see any records, learning logs or other evidence demonstrating a structured programme of study or continuing professional development. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the Applicant had engaged in a structured, sustained, and substantive programme to maintain his professional knowledge and competence since being struck off.
37. The Tribunal considered that maintaining legal knowledge and professional competence would ordinarily be expected of any solicitor seriously contemplating a return to practice. The Tribunal was therefore not persuaded that the limited evidence relied upon by the Applicant materially assisted his contention that he had maintained his professional knowledge and competence since being struck off.
38. The Tribunal considered the Applicant's assertion that he had demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation since his strike-off. The Applicant relied upon a number of matters in support of that contention, including his involvement in legal-related work, his assistance in litigation matters, the references provided on his behalf and his stated intention to return to legal practice.
39. The Tribunal noted that a significant proportion of the material relied upon by the Applicant related either to litigation arising from his own affairs (some involving him as a party) or to assistance provided in matters involving individuals known to him personally. The Tribunal also noted that the examples relied upon were limited in number and scope and did not provide persuasive evidence of sustained involvement in legal work capable of demonstrating meaningful rehabilitation or reducing future risk.
40. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the evidence provided by the Applicant demonstrated substantial and satisfactory employment or involvement in legal work capable of providing persuasive evidence of rehabilitation following findings of dishonesty.

41. The Tribunal next considered the Applicant's evidence concerning his future employment intentions, should restoration be granted. The Applicant relied principally upon a Memorandum of Understanding entered into in 2018, prior to his strike-off, with a prospective law firm and stated that, if restored, he intended to re-engage with those involved. The Applicant accepted in evidence that he had not spoken to the firm for a considerable period and that no current arrangements for employment had been discussed or agreed.
42. The Tribunal noted that the Memorandum of Understanding pre-dated both the Applicant's strike-off and the subsequent period of more than four years during which he had been removed from the Roll. The Tribunal further noted that no current evidence had been produced demonstrating that the arrangements contemplated by that document remained available or under consideration. The Tribunal regarded as significant that there was no evidence from any solicitor or firm of a willingness to employ, supervise or mentor the Applicant in the event of restoration.
43. The Tribunal took account of the Applicant's explanation that securing a firm commitment before restoration would be difficult. It remained the case, however, that no current or sufficiently developed pathway back into regulated practice had been evidenced. Nor was the Tribunal satisfied that there were any identified arrangements capable of providing appropriate supervision or support following restoration. The Tribunal therefore attached limited weight to the Applicant's evidence of his future employment intentions.
44. The Tribunal next considered whether the Applicant had demonstrated sufficient insight into the misconduct which led to his strike-off. The Applicant submitted that he accepted the findings made against him and the Tribunal acknowledged that he had stated this on a number of occasions during the hearing. The Tribunal's assessment, however, was required to extend beyond the Applicant's stated acceptance of the findings and to consider whether the evidence demonstrated a genuine appreciation of the significance and consequences of that misconduct.
45. Whilst the Applicant acknowledged the findings made against him, the Tribunal was not persuaded that his evidence demonstrated, at this stage, the degree of insight, reflection and self-awareness ordinarily expected of an applicant seeking restoration following findings of dishonesty. In particular, certain aspects of his evidence tended to minimise his own responsibility and draw attention instead to that of others and focus upon matters relating to his former business partner, the intervention into his practice and the consequences which he himself had suffered. The Tribunal considered that this demonstrated, at best, only limited insight into the misconduct which led to his strike-off and its wider implications for public confidence in the profession.
46. The Tribunal was similarly concerned by the Applicant's apparent lack of candour in relation to some matters during the restoration proceedings. In particular, the Tribunal was concerned by the presentation of the testimonial evidence of Ms Rajan whom the Applicant put forward as a person to whom he had provided legal assistance. The evidence before the Tribunal established during the course of the proceedings that she was not merely a person he had helped but the Applicant's carer and his former wife. The Tribunal considered that the history and nature of that relationship were plainly relevant to the weight to be attached to that evidence. The failure by the Applicant to identify that

relationship in a clear and transparent manner before or during the hearing did not assist him in demonstrating the degree of candour expected in restoration proceedings.

47. The Tribunal also bore in mind other aspects of the Applicant's evidence which were of concern. These included references to an "unblemished career" notwithstanding the Applicant's regulatory history and judicial observations made in separate civil proceedings in 2017 concerning the Applicant's credibility and reliability. The Tribunal considered those observations, including the finding that the Applicant was found to have lied and given false evidence in support of his case in those proceedings, to be a relevant part of the overall picture against which the Applicant's present application for restoration fell to be assessed.
48. Whilst none of those matters of concern, considered individually, would have been determinative of the application, taken cumulatively they did not assist the Applicant in demonstrating the level of candour, transparency and self-awareness expected of a solicitor seeking restoration to the Roll.
49. Applying the formulation referred to in *Re a Solicitor No. 5 of 1987* as quoted in *Thobani v Solicitors Regulation Authority* [2011] EWHC 3783 (Admin) [at paragraph 28], the Tribunal was not satisfied that a reasonably informed member of the public, knowing the relevant facts would conclude that the profession should be proud to readmit the Applicant as a member.
50. Considering each of the matters relied upon by the Applicant individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances had been established in support of the application. The Tribunal further concluded that the absence of credible employment, supervision or transition arrangements when considered alongside the limited evidence of professional currency, insight and candour meant that the Tribunal could not be satisfied that any future risk would be appropriately managed, having regards to the need to protect of the public and the maintain public confidence in the profession.
51. For those reasons, the Tribunal was not persuaded that restoration at this stage was justified and the Respondent's application for restoration to the Roll was refused.

Costs

52. Dr Elves, on behalf of the Respondent, sought costs in the sum of £8,760.00 as set out in the Respondent's Statement of Costs dated 9 July 2026. Dr Elves further submitted that the professional fees claimed by the Respondent were reasonable. She contended that the costs reflected the significant amount of work required to deal with the material generated during the proceedings and that the counsel's fees claimed were of the order ordinarily incurred in proceedings of this nature. She drew attention to the fact that an adjournment of the originally listed substantive hearing had been caused by the Applicant's failure to advertise his application, and additional costs had been incurred as a result.
53. Mr Skeate opposed the level of costs sought by the Respondent. Whilst he did not submit that the categories of work undertaken by the Respondent were unreasonable, he contended that the Tribunal should have particular regard to the Applicant's limited means and the financial information contained within his Statement of Means. He submitted that the

Applicant's income was derived principally from state benefits including disability-related payments and that those payments were intended to meet basic living needs rather than to provide disposable income. Mr Skeate further submitted that the Applicant's outgoings exceeded his income and that any substantial costs order would impose significant hardship.

54. Mr Skeate submitted that costs orders in restoration applications were discretionary and that applicants should not be discouraged from making *bona fide* applications for restoration. He invited the Tribunal either to decline to make a costs order or, alternatively, to make a substantially reduced award having regard to the Applicant's financial circumstances.

Decision of the Tribunal

55. The Tribunal considered the Respondent's application for costs, the schedule of costs submitted on its behalf, the submissions of both parties and the Applicant's Statement of Means together with the accompanying financial documentation which included a recent bank statement from the Applicant.
56. The Tribunal was satisfied that the costs claimed by the Respondent were reasonable and proportionate. In particular, the Tribunal noted the volume of material generated during the course of the proceedings, including multiple witness statements, supplemental statements and further responses, a number of which were filed by the Applicant outside the Tribunal's directions and required review and response by the Respondent. The Tribunal was also satisfied that the professional fees claimed, including counsel's fees, were reasonable having regard to the nature and conduct of the proceedings.
57. The Tribunal further considered the Applicant's financial circumstances. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant's means were limited and that he was in receipt of some state benefits. However, his Statement of Means was challenged by Ms Elves on behalf of the Respondent who pointed out that he had incorrectly failed to disclose any income at all on the Statement. She submitted that he also claimed to have expenses which were either not shown on his bank statement or were inconsistent with it. The Tribunal also had questions of its own about the Applicant's finances and did not consider the information provided concerning his financial circumstances to be clear or comprehensive or reliable. The Tribunal nevertheless took the Applicant's clearly limited means into account when exercising its discretion as to costs.
58. The Tribunal balanced all of the relevant factors in the exercise of its discretion, including the reasonableness of the Respondent's costs together with the unsatisfactory manner in which the proceedings had been conducted. It took into account that it was the Applicant who had initiated the proceedings and that he had done so in the knowledge that an order for costs was likely to follow if he were unsuccessful, just as such an order had followed when he had made a previous unsuccessful restoration application in the recent past. In addition, although the Tribunal considered the financial information he had provided was incomplete and unreliable in certain respects. It nevertheless accepted that the Applicant was of limited means and reduced the award accordingly.
59. The Tribunal determined that it was appropriate to make a costs order in favour of the Respondent in the sum of £5,000.00.

Statement of Full Order

60. The Tribunal ORDERED that the Application of RAJ RAJAN MARIADDAN for Restoration to the Roll of Solicitors be **REFUSED** and it further Ordered that the Applicant do pay the costs of and incidental to the response to this application fixed in the sum of £5,000.00.

Dated this 14th day of September 2026
On behalf of the Tribunal

J Abramson

J Abramson
Chair