

# SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974

Case No. 12814-2025

**BETWEEN:**

SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY LTD

Applicant

and

CHINYERE INYAMA

Respondent

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Before:

Mrs L Murphy (in the chair)

Mr E Nally

Dr S Bown

Date of Hearing: 26 January 2026

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**Appearances**

Kathryn Hughes, counsel of QEB Hollis Whiteman chambers, 1-2 Laurence Pountney Hill, London EC4R 0EU instructed by Huw Roberts of the Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd, The Cube, 199 Wharfside Street, Birmingham B1 1RN for the Applicant.

The Respondent represented himself.

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**JUDGMENT**

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## Allegations

1. The allegation made against Mr Inyama by the Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited (“SRA”) were that, whilst employed as a Senior Coroner for the West London coroner area:
  - 1.1 On 9 November 2021, he provided inaccurate and/or misleading information to the Chief Coroner’s Office (“CCO”) about the seriousness of the allegations made against him by Nottinghamshire Police.

In doing so, he breached any or all of:

- 1.1.1 Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2019 (‘the Principles’),
- 1.1.2 Principle 4 of the Principles;
- 1.1.3 Principle 5 of the Principles; and
- 1.1.4 Paragraph 1.4 of the Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs (‘the Code’).

## Executive Summary

2. The Tribunal found that Mr Inyama had deliberately sought to mislead the CCO as to the serious nature of the allegations that were under investigation by describing allegations of serious sexual assault as “*touching up*.” In doing so, he had breached the Principles and Code as alleged. The Tribunal’s findings can be accessed below:
  - [The Tribunal’s Findings](#)
3. The Tribunal considered and dismissed the submission that exceptional circumstances applied such that striking off would be disproportionate. Accordingly, the Tribunal ordered that Mr Inyama be struck off the Roll. The Tribunal’s reasoning can be accessed below:
  - [Sanction](#)

## Documents

4. The Tribunal reviewed all the documents submitted by the parties, which included (but was not limited to):
  - Rule 12 Statement [\[here\]](#)
  - Exhibit HR1 dated 7 August 2025
  - The Respondent's Answer dated 8 October 2025 [\[here\]](#)
  - Applicant’s schedule of costs dated 16 January 2026

## Professional Details

5. Mr Inyama was born in 1961 and was admitted as a solicitor in November 1993. Between 1993 and 2003, Mr Inyama worked in private practice as a mental health solicitor. In 2004 he was employed as an Assistant Deputy Coroner until his

appointment as a Senior Coroner in 2011. From 2013 until his dismissal in February 2023, Mr Inyama was a Senior Coroner for the West London coroner area.

### **Factual Background**

6. On 28 October 2021, Mr Inyama was informed by DC Robinson that he was to be voluntarily interviewed under caution in relation to allegations of a historic sexual nature. The interview was scheduled to take place on 7 November 2021; pre-interview disclosure would be provided. Mr Inyama then contacted Mr Parker, (the head of the CCO and private secretary to the Chief Coroner), notifying him of the voluntary interview under caution and explaining that it related to historic allegations of a sexual nature relating to when Mr Inyama was in private practice. Mr Inyama also explained that he was expecting further disclosure at some point
7. On the same date, DC Robinson contacted the Coroner's Society of England and Wales ("CSEW") to advise them that Mr Inyama was to be questioned under caution. The CSEW referred the matter to the CCO who took over communications with the Police.
8. On 29 October 2021, following a request for further information, the Police provided Mr Parker with a more detailed summary of the nature of the offences. In summary, Mr Parker was informed that the allegation was of rape of a female aged over 16 and sexual assault. Mr Parker considered it inappropriate to tell Mr Inyama what the police had disclosed as it was a live police investigation at that time.
9. On 3 November 2021, pre-interview disclosure was sent to Mr Ahmad, (Mr Inyama's solicitor), which recorded that there were two allegations of penetrative sexual activity with a mentally disordered female. The disclosure document was a single page long and said:
 

*"ALLEGATION 1 - Whilst your client Mental Health Solicitor for a female called [REDACTED] is alleged that he accompanied [REDACTED] to a gym/swimming pool in the Newark area of Nottinghamshire. Whilst they were both in the sauna INYAMA began to massage [REDACTED] and touch her all over her body. He then touched her vagina area and inserted his fingers into her vagina.*

*ALLEGATION 2 - Whilst your client was the Mental Health Solicitor for a female called [REDACTED] it is alleged that he accompanied her to a hotel in the Newark area of Nottinghamshire. Whilst in a hotel room he penetrated [REDACTED]'s anus and vagina with his penis on a number of occasions during the same evening and morning."*
10. Both offences were alleged to have occurred between 2001 and 2008.
11. On 5 November 2021, Mr Inyama informed Mr Parker that he had been given limited disclosure and that he expected to know more at the interview. During subsequent disciplinary proceedings, by the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office ("JCIO") Mr Inyama said that he had not read this disclosure prior to the conversation with Mr Parker on 5 November 2021.

12. In the interview Mr Inyama was given more extensive detail about the alleged sexual assaults. He provided a prepared statement and thereafter answered “*no comment*” to all substantive questions. The matter was fully investigated by the police. No charges were brought against Mr Inyama.

### **Witnesses**

13. The following witnesses gave oral evidence:
- Mr Inyama

### **Findings of Fact and Law**

14. The Applicant was required to prove the allegations on the balance of probabilities. The Tribunal had due regard to its statutory duty, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, to act in a manner which was compatible with the Respondent's rights to a fair trial and to respect for his private and family life under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

### **Dishonesty**

The test for dishonesty was that set out in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 at [74] as follows:

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding Tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the factfinder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

When considering dishonesty, the Tribunal firstly established the actual state of Mr Inyama’s knowledge or belief as to the facts, noting that the belief did not have to be reasonable, merely that it had to be genuinely held. It then considered whether that conduct was honest or dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.

### **Integrity**

The test for integrity was that set out in Wingate and Evans v SRA and SRA v Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366, as per Jackson LJ:

“Integrity is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members ... [Professionals] are required to live up to their own professional standards ... Integrity connotes adherence to the ethical standards of one’s own profession.”

15. **Allegation 1.1 - On 9 November 2021, he provided inaccurate and/or misleading information to the CCO about the seriousness of the allegations made against him by Nottinghamshire Police. In doing so, he breached any or all of: Principles 2, 4 and 5 of the Principles; and Paragraph 1.4 of the Code.**

#### The Applicant's Case

- 15.1 The Applicant's case was detailed in its Rule 12 Statement that can be accessed using the link in the documents section of this Judgment above.
- 15.2 In summary it was alleged that in a call on 9 November 2021, Mr Inyama told Mr Parker that there were two allegations of him "*touching up*" a female. Mr Inyama stated that incidents were alleged to have occurred in hospital and in the hostel where the complainant resided. Mr Inyama informed Mr Parker that he did not recall the offences. Mr Parker recorded that the tone of the conversation was that the allegations were false. Mr Inyama also reported that he gave a 'no comment' interview on the advice of his solicitor.
- 15.3 Mr Parker, noting the difference between Mr Inyama's description and the disclosure provided to the CCO, sought clarity from DC Robinson. DC Robinson confirmed that Mr Inyama had received the same disclosure as the CCO.
- 15.4 Mr Parker reported matters to the JCIO due to concerns that Mr Inyama was trying to mislead him by minimising the seriousness of the allegations.
- 15.5 Following a JCIO process, the nominated Judge recommended Mr Inyama's removal from office for what he regarded as "*the most serious form of judicial misconduct*". Mr Inyama was subsequently suspended pending the outcome of the police investigation, a disciplinary panel and the decision of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.
- 15.6 Mr Inyama exercised his right under the Judicial Conduct (Judicial and other office holders) Rules 2014 ("the 2014 Rules") to have a disciplinary panel consider the case before the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice made a final decision.
- 15.7 In a decision dated 22 June 2022, the first Disciplinary Panel found that Mr Inyama's conduct amounted to "*serious judicial misconduct*" and recommended a reprimand. However, the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice agreed that removal from office was the appropriate disciplinary action. As required by the Judicial Conduct (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 2014, before making a final decision, they referred the case to a new disciplinary panel for investigation.
- 15.8 On 19 January 2023, a Disciplinary Panel found Mr Inyama guilty of serious misconduct, and unanimously recommended that he be removed from office. The Disciplinary Panel found that:

*"he deliberately misled the Chief Coroner's Office both as to the extent and the nature of what were very serious allegations of sexual offending against him. He did so in order to minimise the gravity of those allegations. The contrast*

*between the information that he provided to Mr Parker and the contents of his police interview is both stark and striking.”*

- 15.9 Mr Inyama was dismissed as a coroner on 7 February 2023. He self-reported these matters to the SRA on 8 February 2023.
- 15.10 Miss Hughes submitted that by the time of his conversation with Mr Parker on 9 November 2021, Mr Inyama knew the full extent of the allegations through (i) the pre-interview disclosure and (ii) the detailed questioning during the interview. Accordingly, he knew the serious nature of the allegations.
- 15.11 Mr Inyama it was submitted, knew that the term “*touching up*” was very different to, and less serious, than what had been alleged. It was abundantly clear from the pre-interview disclosure and the questions asked in interview that the allegations made were extremely serious in nature. Accordingly, there could be no doubt that Mr Inyama was fully aware of the nature and seriousness of the allegations under investigation.
- 15.12 Mr Inyama was also well aware of his duty to be full and frank in disclosing those allegations. He wilfully and consciously decided to provide misinformation to Mr Parker during the call. The fact that he might have been embarrassed by the nature of the allegations did not negate his knowledge or his obligation to provide frank disclosure.
- 15.13 Given that knowledge, Mr Inyama had deliberately provided Mr Parker with information which he knew to be inaccurate and misleading in that it was a wholly inadequate and inaccurate description of the matters being investigated.
- 15.14 Miss Hughes submitted that ordinary decent people would consider it dishonest for a solicitor to knowingly mislead, or try to mislead, the CCO as to the seriousness of the allegations for which he was under an active police investigation, by describing allegations of digital, anal and vaginal penetration of a vulnerable individual as “*touching up*” of that individual. Accordingly, Mr Inyama’s conduct was dishonest in breach of Principle 4, and he had attempted to mislead the CCO in breach of paragraph 1.4 of the Code.
- 15.15 Such conduct also lacked integrity in breach of Principle 5. A solicitor acting with integrity would not have wilfully provided false and/or misleading information to the CCO or acted in a manner that could have misled the CCO as to the nature and seriousness of matters for which he was under police investigation.
- 15.16 Members of the public would expect a solicitor to act in a straight-forward and transparent manner with colleagues, and other members of the profession. This clearly included not providing information that they know to be inaccurate, and correcting any misleading impression that may have been caused by that information. Members of the public should also be able to place their trust in members of the profession, who were held in high regard. Any behaviour which undermined that trust damaged not only the regulated person, but also the ability of the legal profession as a whole to serve society. In undermining the trust, the public placed in the profession and the provision of legal services by authorised persons, Mr Inyama breached Principle 2

### The Respondent's Case

- 15.17 Mr Inyama denied the allegation, save that he accepted that as he had not acted in a “*straightforward manner*”, and he admitted his conduct in this regard breached Principle 2.
- 15.18 Mr Inyama explained that during the call, he had made it clear that there was an ongoing investigation and that the matter had been referred to RASSO (a police unit that investigates allegations of rape and serious sexual assault). In informing Mr Parker of that referral, it was clear that the allegations made were serious in nature.
- 15.19 At no point did Mr Inyama deliberately try to mislead Mr Parker. Mr Inyama was aware, having been told by DC Robinson, that the CCO was in direct communication with the police in relation to the ongoing investigation. His description of the allegations as “*touching up*” was not in an effort to mislead Mr Parker. Rather, it was as a result of his desire to avoid the embarrassment and shame at the nature of the allegations. His description of the allegations was not rehearsed and was provided spontaneously in the course of the conversation. It was not an attempt, dishonest or otherwise, to shape the narrative to the CCO.
- 15.20 Whilst Mr Inyama did not dispute the matters recorded by Mr Parker, it was not accepted that the note was a verbatim one in circumstances where it did not detail the entirety of the conversation.
- 15.21 With regard to the information provided, Mr Inyama submitted that the Applicant had chosen to extract one part of the conversation, without looking at the totality of the conversation and in particular, Mr Inyama informing Mr Parker of the RASSO referral. This, it was submitted, was an important consideration, evidencing that whilst he had “*underplayed*” the seriousness of the allegations with regards to how he had described them, he had not attempted to minimise the seriousness of the allegations. Matters of sexual touching, it was submitted, would not have been referred to RASSO. Mr Inyama inferred that this would have been known to Mr Parker.
- 15.22 Accordingly, Mr Inyama denied that his conduct was in breach of Principles 4 and 5 and Paragraph 1.4 of the Code.

### The Tribunal's Findings

- 15.23 The issues for the Tribunal to determine were whether Mr Inyama had provided misleading and/or inaccurate information and if so, whether he had breached the Principles and Code as alleged.
- 15.24 The Tribunal noted that there was very little factual dispute between the parties, the factual background detailed in this Judgment above not being challenged. It was Mr Inyama's case that the note of the call was not verbatim. The Tribunal agreed. It was clear from the evidence seen that the note relied upon was not a verbatim note of the entirety of the call. It was Mr Inyama's case that this was an important matter, as it went to the totality of the call and the information he provided as to the seriousness of the matters under investigation.

- 15.25 The Tribunal found that, during the call with the Chief Coroner's Office, Mr Inyama had described the allegations as two incidents of "*touching up*" when in fact, the allegations concerned incidents of non-consensual sexual intercourse and a separate incident of sexual assault, involving a person who was, at the relevant time, Mr Inyama's client.
- 15.26 The Tribunal was satisfied that the description of the allegations given by Mr Inyama materially minimised the nature and seriousness of those allegations. The Tribunal found that even if Mr Inyama had made reference to sexual assault and a referral to RASSO, (those matters not being recorded by Mr Parker), those references were not such that they would alter the minimising nature of his description of the allegations. There was nothing to suggest that Mr Parker would have understood the acronym RASSO, or that he would have understood that what was being investigated were offences that were significantly more serious than "*touching up*."
- 15.27 Mr Inyama accepted, and the Tribunal found, that he was under a duty to provide a full and frank account of the allegations he was facing. The Tribunal was satisfied that the account he gave wholly failed to comply with that duty. Indeed, Mr Inyama had accepted that he was "*less than frank*" on the call. The fact that Mr Inyama was embarrassed by the nature and seriousness of the allegations did not alter his duty to report them in a full and frank manner.
- 15.28 This duty was also unaffected by the fact that Mr Inyama knew that the police were in direct communication with the CCO. As he accepted in his evidence, he was not a party to any calls between the police and the CCO, nor was he copied into any written communication. The Tribunal found that even if the police had provided the CCO with full disclosure of the allegations, this did not affect or negate Mr Inyama's duty to provide a full and frank account himself.
- 15.29 The Tribunal found that it was entirely inappropriate for Mr Inyama to seek to "*underplay*" the nature of the allegations in the knowledge of his obligations, irrespective of his reason for doing so. The Tribunal found that in describing the matters as he had, Mr Inyama had provided information that was both inaccurate and misleading as alleged.
- 15.30 The Tribunal was satisfied that Mr Inyama's admission that his conduct was in breach of Principle 2 was properly made.
- 15.31 The Tribunal found that his conduct also lacked integrity in breach of Principle 5. A solicitor acting with integrity would not, in the knowledge of his duties, provide inaccurate and misleading information due to embarrassment. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Mr Inyama's conduct was in breach of Principle 5 as alleged.
- 15.32 The Tribunal found that Mr Inyama knew the following at the time of the call:
- The allegations were of a serious sexual nature, including allegations of rape
  - The allegations were not accurately described as "*touching up*"
  - He was under a duty to provide full and frank disclosure to the CCO

- 15.33 The Tribunal noted that even on his own case, and taking into account the totality of the information Mr Inyama provided, he accepted that he had been less than frank.
- 15.34 The Tribunal found that ordinary and decent people would find it dishonest for a solicitor, and in particular a solicitor with a judicial role, to provide information which he knew to be inaccurate and misleading in order to hide his own embarrassment. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that Mr Inyama's conduct had been dishonest in breach of Principle 4 and that his conduct also breached paragraph 1.4 of the Code.

### **Previous Disciplinary Matters**

16. No previous matters before the Tribunal

### **Mitigation**

17. Mr Inyama submitted that at the time of the call, he was not thinking clearly. His decision making at the time was impaired by both his personal circumstances and the nature of the matters under investigation. This was a single call, that had taken place in difficult circumstances. There was no dishonest course of conduct, nor was there any intention to mislead. Mr Inyama was aware that there was contact between the CCO and the police and considered that the CCO would have been fully informed of the allegations by the CCO. He was not trying to hide the nature of the allegations, but was embarrassed by their nature.
18. Mr Inyama described his conduct as a single, moment of madness event. He had already lost his judicial career and suffered significant reputational damage as a result. Any sanction imposed by the Tribunal would be akin to his being punished twice for the same conduct and was unduly punitive.
19. Mr Inyama submitted that he did not present any ongoing risk to the public. Any risk had already been ameliorated following his removal from office. Since his dismissal, he had been granted unconditional Practising Certificates from the SRA on application. In all the circumstances, Mr Inyama submitted, striking him off the Roll would be disproportionate

### **Sanction**

20. The Tribunal had regard to the Guidance Note on Sanctions (11<sup>th</sup> Edition – February 2025). The Tribunal's overriding objective, when considering sanction, was the need to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the profession. In determining sanction, it was the Tribunal's role to assess the seriousness of the proven misconduct and to impose a sanction that was fair and proportionate in all the circumstances.
21. The Tribunal determined that Mr Inyama was motivated by his desire to minimise and underplay the allegations, given their serious nature and his embarrassment. His actions were spontaneous; there was no previously defined plan. Mr Inyama breached the trust placed in him by the CCO to provide full and frank disclosure. Given what had been said by Mr Inyama, Mr Parker was concerned that he had been misled. Mr Inyama was an extremely experienced solicitor and a member of the judiciary at a senior level who

was fully aware of his obligations. He was wholly and solely responsible for his misconduct.

22. Mr Inyama had caused significant harm to the reputation of the profession as per Coulson J in Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharma [2010] EWHC 2022 Admin:

*“34. There is harm to the public every time that a solicitor behaves dishonestly. It is in the public interest to ensure that, as it was put in Bolton, a solicitor can be “trusted to the ends of the earth”.”*

23. Mr Inyama’s conduct was aggravated by his proven dishonesty, which was in material breach of his obligation to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the reputation of the profession. His conduct, whilst spontaneous, was deliberate and calculated. Mr Inyama had made a conscious decision, during the call, to underplay the seriousness of the allegations.

24. In mitigation, the Tribunal found that this was a single episode of brief duration. Mr Inyama had self-reported this matter following his dismissal.

25. Given the serious nature of the allegations, the Tribunal considered and rejected the lesser sanctions within its sentencing powers such as no order, a reprimand or restrictions. The Tribunal had regard to the case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486 in which Sir Thomas Bingham stated:

*“...Lapses from the required standard (of complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness)....may....be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty....In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced by the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the roll of solicitors.”*

26. Mr Inyama had submitted that striking him off the Roll would be disproportionate. The Tribunal accepted this as a submission of exceptional circumstances and thus considered the nature, scope and extent of Mr Inyama’s dishonesty. Whilst this was a one-off episode, it was an instance of dishonesty from a senior judicial office holder. Mr Justice Cobb regarded Mr Inyama’s actions as being *“the most serious form of judicial misconduct,”* The Tribunal agreed. The Tribunal rejected Mr Inyama’s submission that this was a *“moment of madness.”* This was a deliberate act by Mr Inyama, calculated to minimise the serious nature of the allegations. As detailed above, the fact that Mr Inyama believed that the CCO would obtain full details from the police was not the point. His obligation was unaffected by this, and he knew that to be the case. The Tribunal found that the nature and extent of Mr Inyama’s dishonesty together with his high level of culpability, outweighed his personal difficulties and personal mitigation. Accordingly, the Tribunal did not find any circumstances that were enough to bring Mr Inyama in line with the residual exceptional circumstances category referred to in the case of Sharma. The Tribunal decided that in view of the serious nature of the misconduct, in that it involved dishonesty, the only appropriate and proportionate sanction was to strike the Mr Inyama off the Roll of Solicitors.

**Costs**

27. Miss Hughes applied for costs in the sum of Application for costs in the sum of £18,557.75. The costs were reasonably incurred in a case that had been properly brought. Following questions from the Tribunal, Miss Hughes conceded that there should be a slight reduction in costs to allow for the shortened hearing time, with costs being claimed for two days when the hearing had taken one.
28. Mr Inyama made no submissions as to the principles of recoverability or quantum. He had not filed a statement of means.
29. The Tribunal determined that there should be a reduction in the costs claimed for the shortened hearing time. The Tribunal also considered that the time claimed for the drafting and finalising the Rule 12 Statement was excessive given that the issues to be determined were not complex, nor was this a case with voluminous exhibits. The Tribunal found that costs which they assessed in the sum of £15,000 were reasonable and proportionate, reflecting the nature of the case and the issues to be considered. Given that Mr Inyama had not provided a statement of means, and had made no submissions about his ability to pay, the Tribunal made no further reduction.

**Statement of Full Order**

30. The Tribunal ORDERED that the Respondent, CHINYERE INYAMA solicitor, be STRUCK OFF the Roll of Solicitors and it further ORDERED that he do pay the costs of and incidental to this application and enquiry fixed in the sum of £15,000.00.

Dated this 29<sup>th</sup> day of January 2026  
On behalf of the Tribunal

*L. Murphy*

L. Murphy  
Chair