

# **SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL**

IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974

Case No. 12074-2020

## **BETWEEN:**

SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

Applicant

and

HARINA ZOEY PANESAR-JAGDEV

Respondent

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Before:

Mr J Evans (in the chair)

Ms C Jones

Ms J Rowe

Date of Hearing: 8 December 2020

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## **Appearances**

Andrew Bullock, barrister of Solicitors Regulation Authority of The Cube, 199 Wharfside Street, Birmingham, B1 1RN, for the Applicant.

Paul Parker, counsel of 4 New Square, Lincoln's Inn, London WC2A 3RJ for the Respondent.

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## **JUDGMENT ON AN AGREED OUTCOME AND WITHDRAWAL OF AN ALLEGATION**

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## **Allegations**

1. The Allegations were as follows:
  - 1.1. On or about 22 August 2018 the Respondent: (a) created a copy of an original email timed at 10.11 on 13 August 2018; (b) which she then falsified by amending the name of the addressee; and (c) then forwarded it to her client purporting it to be a true copy of the original document. She thereby breached any or all of:
    - 1.1.1 Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011;
    - 1.1.2 Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011. *[Withdrawn]*
  - 1.2. On or about the same date she: (a) created a second copy of the same original email; (b) which she then falsified by deleting the name of an addressee; and (c) forwarded it to her client again purporting it to be a true copy of the original document. She thereby breached any or all of:
    - 1.2.1 Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011;
    - 1.2.2 Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011.

In addition, each of the Allegations set out above was advanced on the basis that the Respondent's conduct was dishonest. Dishonesty was alleged as an aggravating feature of the Respondent's misconduct but was not an essential ingredient in proving the Allegations.

## **Documents**

2. The Tribunal had the following documents before it:-
  - The Form of Application dated 7 April 2020
  - Rule 12 Statement dated 7 April 2020
  - Statement of Agreed Facts and Proposed Outcome dated 7 December 2020
  - Respondent's Answer 12 May 2020
  - The Tribunal's Memorandum dated 25 May 2020

## **Background**

3. The Respondent was born in December 1989. She was admitted to the Roll on 1 March 2016. Between 1 March 2016 and 14 December 2018, she was employed by LCF Residential Limited ("the Firm"). She practised in the field of residential conveyancing.
4. In August 2018 the Respondent was acting for Client A in a conveyancing transaction concerning the sale of a leasehold flat. The Managing Agent for the property was B Ltd.
5. On 13 August 2018 at 10.11 the Respondent mistakenly sent an email ("Email One") which was intended for B Ltd to C Ltd. Client A was copied into that email.

6. C Ltd was a client of the Firm and for whom the Respondent had previously acted but was unconnected with this transaction. The mistake occurred because the email addresses which were held for B Ltd and C Ltd on the Firm's system were confusingly similar.
7. On 22 August 2018 at 09.28 the Respondent sent a chaser email to B Ltd but again, in error, sent the email to C Ltd. Client A was copied into that email.
8. The error in the address of the email was brought to the Respondent's attention by an email which she received from a representative of C Ltd at 09.35 on 22 August 2018.
9. In order to ensure that no further emails were mistakenly sent to C Ltd instead of B Ltd on the Client A file, the Respondent then amended the copy of Email One on the Firm's system by changing the name of the addressee from C Ltd to B Ltd (Email Two). Except for this change to the name of the addressee, Email Two was identical to Email One. Email Two therefore showed that Client A had been copied into the correspondence.
10. Later that morning, Client A, who had seen Email One and the email sent at 09.28, spoke to the Respondent and queried how many emails had been sent to the wrong address (because she was concerned that the error might have delayed the sale of her leasehold property).
11. The Respondent reassured Client A that, on each occasion when an email had been sent to the wrong address in error, the error had been rectified promptly.
12. The Respondent then created a further copy of Email One, which was identical to Email Two except that it did not show Client A as having been copied into the correspondence ("Email Three"). She then emailed a screen shot of Email Three to Client A at 10.32 on 22 August 2018 as confirmation that she had corrected her mistake in addressing Email One to C Ltd, rather than B Ltd, on 13 August 2018.

**Application for the matter to be resolved by way of Agreed Outcome and withdrawal of Allegation 1.1.**

13. The parties invited the Tribunal to deal with the Allegations against the Respondent in accordance with the Statement of Agreed Facts and Outcome annexed to this Judgment. The parties submitted that the outcome proposed was consistent with the Tribunal's Guidance Note on Sanction.
14. However, whilst this matter had been presented to the Tribunal for consideration on the papers, the Tribunal's preliminary view was that a case in which dishonesty had been admitted, and for which the proposed sanction was a suspension of 6 months, merited the attendance of the parties.
15. The Tribunal required oral submissions on the matters set out in the Statement of Agreed Facts and for the parties to address the Tribunal on the exceptional circumstances which they said pertained in this case.
16. The matter was adjourned to the afternoon pending parties' attendance.

## The Applicant's Submissions

17. Mr Bullock for the Applicant explained why the proposed order would be in accordance with the Tribunal's Guidance Note on Sanction.
18. The Respondent had admitted dishonesty and Mr Bullock reminded the Tribunal of the relevant sections within the Tribunal's "Guidance Note on Sanction" (November 2019) which considered sanctions following findings of dishonesty:

*"The most serious misconduct involves dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. A finding that an allegation of dishonesty has been proved will almost invariably lead to striking off, save in exceptional circumstances (see Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharma [2010] EWHC 2022 (Admin))."*

*In Sharma Coulson J summarised the consequences of a finding of dishonesty by the Tribunal against a solicitor as follows: "(a) Save in exceptional circumstances, a finding of dishonesty will lead to the solicitor being struck off the Roll ... That is the normal and necessary penalty in cases of dishonesty ... (b) There will be a small residual category where striking off will be a disproportionate sentence in all the circumstances ... (c) In deciding whether or not a particular case falls into that category, relevant factors will include the nature, scope and extent of the dishonesty itself, whether it was momentary ... or over a lengthy period of time ... whether it was a benefit to the solicitor ... and whether it had an adverse effect on others ..."*

19. Mr Bullock referred to matters set out in the Statement of Facts and informed the Tribunal that the admitted allegation related to the amendment of the name of the addressee of a single short email, which did not contain sensitive or privileged information, sent on 22 August 2018. The Respondent corrected the error in the address of the email and ensured that it reached its proper destination, but, in a moment of panic, tried unsuccessfully to conceal that error from Client A.
20. She did not benefit from her actions and would not have done so even if her attempt at the concealment of her mistake had been successful (save and except to the extent that some minor embarrassment with Client A might have been avoided). Client A was not, in fact, misled by her actions (and the chances that she would have been misled were always remote because she had been cc'd into Emails One and Two).
21. There was no detrimental effect on Client A or on Client A's transaction.
22. Further, the Respondent having attended a successful interview for alternative employment on 25 August 2018, handed in her notice in September 2018 and left the Firm in December 2018, the Firm having unsuccessfully tried to persuade her to stay in the full knowledge of what had occurred on 22 August 2018.
23. The Respondent remained in the same employment with her current employers who are aware of the matter.

24. Mr Bullock submitted that there were exceptional circumstances which, on a consideration of the facts in this case, would allow the Tribunal to accept that the Respondent fell within *the small residual category* where striking off would be a disproportionate sanction.
25. That said, the matter was still a serious one in which the Respondent had direct responsibility for her actions, which were designed to conceal a mistake and for which her culpability was high.
26. The Respondent's actions were a significant departure from the "*complete, integrity and probity*" expected of a solicitor and corresponding harm had been caused to the reputation of the provision of legal services. The misconduct, aggravated by dishonesty, was of such seriousness that a reprimand, a restriction order or a fine would be each be an insufficient sanction.
27. Mr Bullock submitted that in all the circumstances of the case, it would be proportionate and in the public interest for the Respondent to be suspended from practice for a period of 6 months.
28. In terms of a guide by which the Tribunal could determine the appropriate period of suspension, Mr Bullock told the Tribunal of the case of O which had recently been before a differently constituted Division of the Tribunal and in which he had represented the Applicant.
29. With the caveat that the judgment in O had not yet been published, Mr Bullock informed the Tribunal that O had received a sanction of 6 months suspension (having voluntarily suspended herself for a period of 18 months) for an episode of dishonesty spanning about an hour. O, who was later diagnosed as being on the autistic spectrum, had found herself in the grip of unbearable panic when she realised that she had missed a court hearing date.
30. In comparison to the Respondent's case, the matter of O had more aggravating factors which were as follows:
  - O had made untrue statements to her employer, client and the court;
  - The dishonesty would not have been readily identifiable by O's employer as the act of concealment was greater in that she had destroyed a document.
31. In the case of the Respondent:
  - Her conduct on 22 August 2018 was a single, isolated incident of misconduct. She was not guilty of a pre-meditated attempt at deception but, rather, made a momentary wrong decision as to how to answer her client's query.
  - She self-reported the matter to her supervisor on 23 August 2018 and thereafter took full responsibility for her actions.
  - She did not benefit from her actions.

- There was no adverse effect on the client (who was not deceived by her actions), or on the client's conveyancing transaction.
- She previously had a clean regulatory history and the Firm had had no occasion to question her conduct on any previous occasion or since.
- Her supervisor and her client have been supportive of her position in correspondence with the SRA.
- Her current employers have been aware of this matter since the 'Explanation of conduct' letter dated 24 July 2019 was received by the Respondent and have been supportive of her.

### **The Respondent's Submissions**

32. Mr Parker, for the Respondent, told the Tribunal that, as a matter of policy, it had to be recognised that any proved act of dishonesty must receive a sanction of sufficient seriousness and in many cases this would require the ultimate sanction of strike off from the Roll of solicitors.
33. However, each case had to be assessed on its own facts and circumstances and in this case the Respondent had had a classic 'moment of madness' in which it was clear from the papers that, after she had sent the e-mails to the wrong parties, copying in her client, her attempt to conceal her mistake had taken place in a split second of panic which was devoid of any pre-meditation. It was an act which was doomed to immediate failure and discovery by the client who had been copied into the earlier incorrect e-mails.
34. Mr Parker broadly agreed with the submissions made by Mr Bullock and said that exceptional circumstances had been made out in this case and that all the boxes in SRA v James, MacGregor and Naylor [2018] EWHC 3058 (Admin) had been ticked.
35. When considering the nature, scope and extent of the dishonesty, this was as inept an example as it could be and more akin to the 'dog ate my homework' excuse than a calculated plot to conceal dishonesty of a protracted and ongoing nature. This analogy was not intended make light of the matter, which was serious, but to place it in its proper context.
36. This had been a momentary lapse; the Respondent had not benefitted in any way; there had been no adverse effect on any party to the transaction which had not been prejudiced by the Respondent's actions.
37. The Respondent was a young solicitor who had learned from her mistake and she was not a threat to the public or to the honour of the profession. This was an exceptional case where suspension for 6 months was the correct and just sanction.
38. The Tribunal thanked Mr Bullock and Mr Parker for attending at very short notice and for their assistance.

## Findings of Fact and Law

39. The Applicant was required to prove the allegation on the balance of probabilities. The Tribunal had due regard to the Respondent's rights to a fair trial and to respect for her private and family life under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
40. The Tribunal reviewed all the material before it and had listened with considerable care to the submissions presented to it by Mr Bullock and Mr Parker.
41. The Tribunal was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent's admissions were properly made and the Tribunal accepted that had been a single course of conduct which took place in a period of less than an hour.
42. In the circumstances of the Respondent's admissions, including dishonesty, and the material set out in the Statement of Agreed Facts, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was not proportionate and in the public interest to pursue allegation 1.1 and gave the Applicant permission to withdraw Allegation 1.1.
43. The Tribunal had respectful regard to the observation of Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 that the fundamental purpose of sanctions against solicitors was:

*"to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth..."*

*Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Lapses from the required high standard may, of course, take different forms and be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors...."*

44. The Tribunal considered the Guidance Note on Sanction (November 2019). In doing so the Tribunal assessed the culpability and harm identified together with the aggravating and mitigating factors that existed.
45. The Tribunal observed that allegations involving dishonesty were always to be considered amongst the most serious with which the Tribunal dealt, however not all cases were the same and the facts of individual cases would, on rare occasion, result in a sanction short of strike off should exceptional circumstances be found as set out in Sharma.
46. In SRA v James, MacGregor and Naylor it was said that exceptional circumstances must relate in some way to the dishonesty and that, as a matter of principle, factors relevant to the evaluation could include personal mitigation.

47. In evaluating whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying a lesser sanction in this case, the focus of the Tribunal was on the nature and extent of the dishonesty, degree of culpability and then to engage in a balancing exercise as part of that evaluation between those critical questions on the one hand and matters personal to the Respondent on the other.
48. The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had an otherwise unblemished record, although at the time of the admitted dishonesty she had only been on the Roll for about 2 years. The Tribunal had been informed that the Respondent had been retained by the firm she had worked for at the time of the incident and had since obtained work with another firm. Both firms were aware of the allegations the Respondent had faced.
49. The Tribunal accepted that this had been a fleeting or momentary lapse of judgement which had lasted a very brief period of time before discovery and also noted that the Respondent had promptly self-reported the incident. On that basis, this case was distinct from other cases of dishonesty in which hours, days and weeks had gone by before the dishonesty had come to light.
50. Further, the Respondent had not benefitted from her actions and there had been no adverse effect on the client (who was not deceived by her actions), or on the client's conveyancing transaction.
51. Having carefully considered all the information with which it had been provided, the Tribunal took view that this was a paradigm example of a 'moment of madness' and it was minded to accede to the joint submissions of the parties that there existed exceptional circumstances in the Respondent's case, such that this was a matter which fell into the small residual category of cases for which strike off from the Roll would be a disproportionate sanction.
52. The Tribunal considered that, having accepted that exceptional circumstances pertained to this case, suspension was the appropriate sanction as public confidence in the profession demanded no lesser sanction to protect both the public and the reputation of the legal profession.
53. Further, following the finding of exceptional circumstances, each case then fell to be considered on a spectrum, with the individual facts pointing the way to the appropriate level and duration of sanction. Having listened carefully to Mr Bullock's submissions on the point, the Tribunal were, on balance, persuaded that the period of 6 months' suspension was the appropriate duration for the suspension in this case.

### **Costs**

54. The parties agreed that the Respondent should pay the Applicant's costs of this matter in the sum of £1,680.



**Statement of Full Order**

55. The Tribunal Ordered that the Respondent, HARINA ZOEY PANESAR-JAGDEV, solicitor, be suspended from practice as a solicitor for the period of 6 months, to commence on the 8<sup>th</sup> day of December 2020 and it further Ordered that she do pay the costs of and incidental to this application and enquiry fixed in the sum of £1,680.00.

Dated this 14<sup>th</sup> day of December 2020  
On behalf of the Tribunal



J Evans  
Chair

**JUDGMENT FILED WITH THE LAW SOCIETY**  
**15 DEC 2020**

**Number: 12074-2020**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE SOLICITORS ACT 1974**

**SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY**

**Applicant**

**HARINA ZOEY PANESAR-JAGDEV**

**Respondent**

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**STATEMENT OF AGREED FACTS AND PROPOSED OUTCOME**

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1. By its application dated 7 April 2020, and the statement made pursuant to Rule 12 (2) of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019 which accompanied that application, the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("the SRA") brought proceedings before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal making two allegations of misconduct against Ms. Harina Zoey Panesar-Jagdev.

**The allegations**

2. The allegations against Ms. Panesar-Jagdev, made by the SRA within that statement were that: -

- 1.1. On or about 22 August 2018 she:

- (a) created a copy of an original email timed at 10.11 on 13 August 2018.

- (b) which she then falsified by amending the name of the addressee; and

- (c) then forwarded it to her client purporting it to be a true copy of the original document.

She thereby breached any or all of:

1.1.1. Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011.

1.1.2. Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011.

1.2. On or about the same date she:

(a) created a second copy of the same original email.

(b) which she then falsified by deleting the name of an addressee; and

(c) forwarded it to her client again purporting it to be a true copy of the original document.

She thereby breached any or all of:

1.2.1. Principle 2 of the SRA Principles 2011.

1.2.2. Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011.

3. In addition, dishonesty was alleged as an aggravating factor with respect to each of these allegations.

4. Ms. Panesar-Jagdev admits the allegations set out in paragraph 1.2 above. The SRA applies to withdraw the allegations further set out in paragraph 1.1 on the basis that:

4.1. In light of the contents of Ms. Panesar Jagdev's Answer to the Rule 12 (2)

Statement dated 10 May 2020, the documents disclosed with that document and the limited admissions which are now being made the SRA considers that unable to prove those allegations upon the balance of probabilities.

In particular, the SRA accepts that it can neither rebut her explanation for the circumstances in which the email which is the subject of allegation 1.1 came to be amended; nor can it now submit that she is a wholly untruthful witness whose evidence cannot be believed.

4.2. In any case, considering the admissions made by Ms. Panesar-Jagdev it is not proportionate and in the public interest to pursue allegation 1.1. Proof of allegation 1.1 would not add to penalty on the facts of this matter.

In particular, the SRA concedes that the act which is the subject of allegation 1.1 formed part of a single course of conduct with the act which is the subject of allegation 1.2. That course of conduct took place in a period of less than an hour. Proof of allegation 1.1. would not therefore take this case outside of the small residual category of cases where striking off is a disproportionate penalty for dishonesty.

**Agreed Facts**

5. The following facts and matters, which are relied upon by the SRA in support of the allegations set out within paragraphs 2 and 3 of this statement, are agreed between the SRA and Ms. Panesar-Jagdev.

- 5.1. Ms. Panesar-Jagdev who was born December 1989, is a solicitor having been admitted to the Roll on 1 March 2016. Between 1 March 2016 and 14 December 2018, she was employed by LCF Residential Limited (“the Firm”). She practised in the field of residential conveyancing.
- 5.2. In August 2018, Ms. Panesar-Jagdev was acting for Client A in a conveyancing transaction concerning the sale of a leasehold flat. The Managing Agent for the property was B Ltd.
- 5.3. On 13 August 2018 at 10.11 Ms. Panesar-Jagdev mistakenly sent an email (“Email One”) which was intended for B Ltd to C Ltd. Client A was copied into that email.
- 5.4. C Ltd was a client of the Firm, unconnected with the transaction, for whom Ms. Panesar-Jagdev had previously acted. The mistake occurred because the email addresses which were held for B Ltd and C Ltd on the Firm’s system were confusingly similar.
- 5.5. On 22 August 2018 at 09.28 Ms Panesar-Jagdev sent a chaser email to B Ltd but again, in error, sent the email to C Ltd. Client A was copied into that email. The error in the address of the email was brought to the attention of Ms. Panesar-Jagdev by an email which she received from representative of C Ltd at 09.35 on 22 August 2018. In order to ensure that no further emails were mistakenly sent to C Ltd instead of B Ltd on the Client A file, she then amended the copy of Email One on the Firm’s system by changing the name of the addressee from C Ltd to B Ltd (Email Two). Except for this change to the name of the addressee, Email Two was identical to Email One. Email Two therefore showed that Client A had been copied into the correspondence.

5.6. Later that morning, Client A, who had seen Email One and the email sent at 09.28, spoke to Ms. Panesar-Jagdev and queried how many emails had been sent to the wrong address (because she was concerned that the error might have delayed the sale of her leasehold property). Ms. Panesar-Jagdev reassured her that, on each occasion when an email had been sent to the wrong address in error, the error had been rectified promptly.

5.7. Ms. Panesar-Jagdev then created a further copy of Email One, which was identical to Email Two except that it did not show Client A as having been copied into the correspondence ("Email Three"). She then emailed a screen shot of Email Three to Client A at 10.32 on 22 August 2018 as confirmation that she had corrected her mistake in addressing Email One to C Ltd, rather than B Ltd, on 13 August 2018.

### **Non-Agreed Mitigation**

6. The following mitigation, which is not agreed by the SRA, is put forward by Ms. Panesar-Jagdev:

6.1.1. Her conduct on 22 August 2018 was a single, isolated, incident of misconduct.

6.1.2. She was not guilty of a pre-meditated attempt at deception but, rather, made a momentary wrong decision as to how to answer her client's query.

6.1.3. She self-reported the matter to her supervisor on 23 August 2018 and thereafter took full responsibility for her actions.

6.1.4. She did not benefit from her actions.

6.1.5. There was no adverse effect on the client who was not deceived by her actions, or on the client's conveyancing transaction.

6.1.6. She had previously had a clean regulatory history and the Firm had had no occasion to question her conduct on any previous occasion or since.

6.1.7. Her supervisor and her client have been supportive of her position in correspondence with the SRA.

6.1.8. Her current employers have been aware of this matter since the 'Explanation of conduct' letter dated 24 July 2019 was received by Ms Panesar-Jagdev and have been supportive of her.

### **Penalty proposed**

7. It is therefore proposed that Ms. Panesar-Jagdev should be suspended from practice for a period of six months.
8. With respect to costs, it is further agreed that Ms. Panesar-Jagdev should pay the SRA's costs of this matter agreed in the sum of £1,680.

### **Explanation as to why such an order would be in accordance with the Tribunal's sanctions guidance**

9. Ms. Panesar-Jagdev has admitted dishonesty. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal's "Guidance Note on Sanction" (5th edition), at paragraph 47, states that: "*The most serious misconduct involves dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. A finding that an allegation of dishonesty has been proved will almost*

*invariably lead to striking off, save in exceptional circumstances (see Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharma [2010] EWHC 2022 (Admin)).*”

10. In **Sharma [2010] EWHC 2022 (Admin)** at [13] Coulson J summarised the consequences of a finding of dishonesty by the Tribunal against a solicitor as follows:

*“(a) Save in exceptional circumstances, a finding of dishonesty will lead to the solicitor being struck off the Roll ... That is the normal and necessary penalty in cases of dishonesty...*

*(b) There will be a small residual category where striking off will be a disproportionate sentence in all the circumstances ...*

*(c) In deciding whether or not a particular case falls into that category, relevant factors will include the nature, scope and extent of the dishonesty itself, whether it was momentary ... or over a lengthy period of time ... whether it was a benefit to the solicitor ... and whether it had an adverse effect on others...”*

11. The admitted allegation relates to the amendment of the name of the addressee of a single short email, which did not contain sensitive or privileged information, sent on 22 August 2018. Ms. Panesar-Jagdev corrected the error in the address of the email and ensured that it reached its proper destination, but, in a moment of panic, tried unsuccessfully to conceal that error from Client A. She did not benefit from her actions and would not have done so even if her attempt at the concealment of her mistake had been successful (save and except to the extent that some minor embarrassment with Client A might have been avoided). Client A was not, in fact, misled by her actions (and the chances that she would have been misled were always remote because she had been cc'd into Emails One and



Two). There was no detrimental effect on Client A or on Client A's transaction. Having attended a successful interview for alternative employment on 25 August 2018, Ms Panesar-Jagdev handed in her notice in September 2018 and left the Firm in December 2018, the Firm having unsuccessfully tried to persuade her to stay in the full knowledge of what had occurred on 22 August 2018. She remains in the same employment with her current employers who are aware of the matter. The case therefore falls within the small residual category where striking off would be a disproportionate sentence.

12. However, Ms. Panesar-Jagdev had direct responsibility for her actions, which were designed to conceal a mistake, and her culpability was high. Those actions were a significant departure from the "*complete, integrity and probity*" expected of a solicitor and corresponding harm has been caused to the reputation of the provision of legal services. Her misconduct, which was aggravated by dishonesty, was therefore still serious such that neither a reprimand, a restriction order or a fine is a sufficient sanction or in all the circumstances appropriate.

13. In all the circumstances of the case, it is therefore proportionate and in the public interest that Ms. Panesar-Jagdev should be suspended from practice for a period of six months.

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Andrew John Bullock, Senior Legal Adviser upon behalf of the SRA

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Andrea Cohen, Weightmans LLP, on behalf of Zoey Harina Panesar-Jagdev